- Dirty Water: Mapping Projected Climate Change Impacts in the United States and Abroad
- Money and Methods in Cancer Research
- Report Details How Climate Change Will Spark Heat Waves, Increase the Spread of Disease, and Erode Coastal Economies
- FDA Looks to Open Up the Medicine Cabinet
- NIH Funding is Good for Your Health, and It’s Good for the Economy
- Progressive Science Values
- Climate Change Will Not Be Kind to American Water and Agriculture
- Less Philosophy, More Policy: Obama Disbands Council on Bioethics and Will Create New One
- The Digital Textbook Case
- The Worn Grooves of Disciplinary Research
- NIH By the Numbers: Challenge Grants, Stem Cell Comments, and Conflict of Interest Rules
- States Are Looking to Grow Their Biotech Sectors
One Eye Open for Dual-Use Research
The recent federal investigation of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the Army bioterrorism researcher suspected of facilitating the 2001 anthrax attacks, is drawing media attention to dual-use research and could provide an opportune moment for biotech researchers to take another look at the rules that govern work with deadly pathogens. Michael Stebbins, director of biology policy for the Federation of American Scientists, outlined the basic considerations of an effective awareness program for this research in a recent Science Progress column, “The ‘What if?’ of Dual-Use Research Awareness.” Such an awareness program would allow scientists, law enforcement, biosafety officers, or institutional review boards to better recognize when research can be misused and how it can better comply with legal and ethical regulations.
Among other things, Stebbins recommends an independent and Internet-based reporting system which supplements dual-use awareness programs and allows researchers to report suspicious activity. He points out that if scientists are going to learn about the misuse of dangerous agents, then they need an outlet to report potential problems. In his suggested system, scientists would be able to report their concerns and receive advice and recommendations on the steps that they should or should not take.
The scientific community also has to improve its oversight over who has access to lethal substances. Following the 2001 attacks, there was a huge rise in biodefense research. Current estimations reveal that around 14,000 people at over 400 laboratories have access to chemicals that that can be used in the construction of bioweapons. The current federal oversight procedures are not expansive enough to ensure that all of these users are following security rules and reporting events—including the suspicious activity of co-workers—which could threaten fellow workers or the public.
On the other hand, our country is now more prepared to handle bioterrorist attacks. Research has led to vaccines which could potentially treat smallpox or the Ebola virus, and has also increased stockpiles of antibiotics that treat infectious agents.
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