Philosophy Lab

A recent Scientific American article asked: “Can a robot, an insect, or God be aware?” This question seems philosophical, but current work is taking an empirical approach to the matter. Researchers in the newly emerging field of experimental philosophy use quantitative methods, often opinion polls, to assess how people feel about philosophical matters such as the nature of consciousness. Though it sounds radical, research in experimental philosophy can provide critical information in making informed decisions on controversial issues in bioethics and public policy.

The new field considers timely questions about morality, empathy, and the way in which people perceive the world. One study reports that people were willing to say that a robot “believes that triangles have three sides,” but were unwilling to say “it feels happy when it gets what it wants.” This sheds light on how individuals approach what philosophers call “phenomenal consciousness,” the capacity of something to have a subjective experience of feeling.

Joshua Knobe, author of the Scientific American article and an assistant professor of philosophy at University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, interprets the results by suggesting that, “perhaps the issue here is that people only attribute phenomenal consciousness to creatures that have the right sort of bodies.” This type of argument emerges in debates over embryonic stem cell research when proponents of the research argue that philosophical objections to the work do not coincide with the cultural practice of the objectors.   Proponents argue, for instance, that whereas a baby is embodied, an embryo is not, or the embryo lacks “continuity of form.” In other words, when  someone sees a baby picture and says, “That is me as a baby,” they would likely lack the same response if shown a picture of an embryo from which they developed.

Delving into this issue, experimental philosophers need to distinguish between a view based on the particular body of an entity and a view that reflects trained empathy. Trained empathy differs from basic empathy in that the former is the product of an individual’s cultural identity. For example, killing and eating certain animals, like dogs and cats, is frowned upon and criminalized in the United States; in other cultures, this is not the case. Further experimentation could expand our understanding of moral decision-making process and the reasons that certain policies are acceptable or objectionable to certain individuals.

It is not entirely clear whether experimental philosophy lies under the umbrella of cognitive science or sits as a distinct but connected field.  A researcher’s training, experimental methodology, and the questions used in opinion surveys may all determine whether a project is experimental philosophy or cognitive science. Studies in experimental philosophy start from philosophical questions and often shed light on cognitive phenomena, where studies in cognitive science start from cognitive phenomena and often shed light on philosophical questions.  Undoubtedly, there are shades of grey between the fields that make placing a study in one camp or the other complicated.

But this consideration misses the point.  Philosophers are now wielding the tools of social science to shed light on challenging philosophical questions.  This adds a quantitative dimension to discussions in moral philosophy and thereby gives policymakers more data with which to work.

Tags: cognitive science

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