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National Academies Explore Interdisciplinary Research
The National Research Council of the National Academies convened a symposium Wednesday to explore approaches among “Future Directions in Research at the Intersection of the Physical and Life Sciences.” The intersections up for discussion ranged across the research spectrum: from synthetic biology to geoengineering to bioterrorism.
In assessing the possibility of using geoengineering projects to mitigate the effects of global climate change, Dr. Daniel Schrag from Harvard University arrived at a conclusion similar to that articulated by Chris Mooney in a recent Science Progress column: given certain catastrophic warming scenarios, geoengineering would be a complex but possibly necessary solution. But he was careful to say that that, “geoengineering is a band-aid for a wound that keeps getting bigger.” He emphasized the importance and feasibility of “changing our energy infrastructure,” which he noted, “will only cost 1% of our GDP.”
Presenting on research in counter-bioterrorism, Dr. James Baker of the University of Michigan highlighted work measuring and characterizing the physical processes by which viruses and their antidotes bind to cells. He explained that understanding this process could reveal populations that are particuarly susceptible to certain kinds of viruses; from there, researchers could explore how to protect or treat those populations. He also explained that bioterrorism is uniquely difficult to prevent or respond to when compared to conventional terrorism, saying that, “bombs, weapons, and planes can be traced; but with a virus, we don’t know if it is natural or not.” He added that in investigating the West Nile virus and SARS outbreaks, the CDC examined whether or not terrorists had released the pathogens. Noting that “we haven’t had the modeling or characterization we’ve had with nuclear,” he went on to suggest that first responders need to develop more sophisticated methods for handling potential bioterror scenarios.
Dr. Jay Keasling of UC Berkeley and Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, also presented a cautionary warning on the dual-use dangers of the rapidly expanding field of synthetic biology, saying, “biology is so complex, its easier to do harm than good.” He called for “a standard-setting organization like IEEE,” that would both ensure the safety and expand the scale of the synthetic biology industry by implementing the use of prefabricated biological components. Such components would allow different biotech firms to maximize and economize their creativity while remaining within industry-imposed boundaries that will keep their creations safe.
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